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 The separation of church and state is a key element of American 
democracy, but its interpretation has been challenged as the country grows 
more diverse. In American Legion v. American Humanist Association, the 
Supreme Court adopted a new standard to analyze whether a religious 
symbol on public land maintained by public funding violated the 
Constitution’s Establishment Clause. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In American Legion v. American Humanist Association, the 
American Humanist Association (“AHA”) sought the removal, alteration, 
or destruction of a 32-foot Latin Cross (“the Cross”) which served as a 
World War I memorial in Prince George’s County, Maryland.1 Although 
the Cross had stood uncontested for nearly a century, the AHA asserted it 
was a religious symbol built on public land and maintained by local 
government, thereby violating the Establishment Clause.2 The Court found 
that while the Cross was a religious symbol, it did not depart from the 
history and tradition of the founding fathers and was therefore 
constitutional under a new evaluation of the Establishment Clause.3 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1925, a committee of residents from Prince George’s County, 
Maryland constructed the Cross to commemorate forty-nine local men and 
women who died in World War I.4 The Latin cross had become a symbol 
for the war, and the committee began raising funds for the project through 
local events and donations. 5 The committee eventually ran out of funding, 
however the American Legion intervened and completed construction.6  
Over the next ninety years, the cross became surrounded by 
development, including multiple memorials to other wars as well as a busy 
intersection.7 The bustling intersection prompted the Maryland-National 
Capital Park and Planning Commission, (the “Commission”), a state 
entity, to purchase the Cross and the land on which it stood.8 
In 2012, the AHA, joined by three local residents, sued the 
Commission in U.S. District Court, alleging that the Cross and the 
 
1. American Legion v. American Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 
2078 (2019) (plurality). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 2074 
5. Id. at 2075. 
6. Id. at 2077. 
7. Id. at 2077-78. 
8. Id. at 2078. 
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Commission’s maintenance of it violated the Establishment Clause.9 The 
AHA requested the Cross be removed, demolished, or altered to form an 
obelisk.10 The district court granted summary judgment for the 
Commission, finding its ownership and maintenance of the Cross satisfied 
the three-prong test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman11 because it (1) had 
a secular purpose; (2) did not promote or condemn a religion; and (3) did 
not constitute an excessive intermingling of church and state.12 On appeal, 
the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court’s application of the Lemon 
test, ruling that the Cross indeed failed each prong.13  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
  In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court found 
for the American Legion and uniformly rejected the Lemon test, however 
the Justices differed in their reasoning.14  
 
A.  Plurality Opinion 
  
The Court began by recognizing the Lemon test’s ambitious 
attempt to better define the relationship between government and 
religion.15 Nevertheless, the Court noted that on numerous occasions it had 
“either expressly declined to apply the test or [had] simply ignored it” 
because the test could not explain the endorsement of religious symbols or 
government practices.16 
 The Court specified four reasons to avoid the Lemon Test.17 First, 
monuments were often established so long ago that their original purposes 
were difficult to identify.18 Second, the purposes associated with 
established monuments, symbols, or practices multiply over time.19 Third, 
the message of a monument may evolve over time. And fourth, removing 
such a monument may be viewed as hostile to religion rather than 
neutral.20  
 
9. Id. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. I (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."). 
NOTE: I’m not sure if this is necessary, but I thought it might be good to include the 
clause somewhere in the piece. I’ll leave it up to you whether to keep or not thought. 
10. Id. 
11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
12. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2078-79 (plurality); Lemon, 403 U.S. 
at 612-13. 
13. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2079 (plurality). 
14. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2090 (plurality). 
15. Id. at 2080. 
16. Id.  
17. Id. at 2081. 
18. Id. at 2082. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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The Court found the Cross perfectly illustrated these four 
reasons.21 Although the Latin cross was clearly a religious symbol, the 
Court determined it had no way to deduce the builders’ intent and could 
not tell whether the Cross was primarily intended to represent the war.22 
Additionally, the purposes for maintaining the Cross since its construction 
may have multiplied to include historic preservation and traffic-safety 
concerns.23 The Cross’ significance may have also changed with time, as  
surrounding development introduced other monuments and a busy 
intersection.24 Finally, removing the Cross may not be seen as neutral 
because it had become a familiar part of the physical and cultural 
landscape.25 
In light of the Lemon test’s impracticalities, the Court noted that 
it had subsequently adopted a different approach to the Establishment 
Clause that focused on a particular issue and looked to history and tradition 
for guidance.26 In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court found that 
opening a town council meeting with prayer was constitutional because it 
mirrored Congress’ historical use of prayer at the start of each session.27  
While historical use alone would not validate unconstitutional 
practices, the Court nevertheless looked at the surrounding context.28 
Notably, the First Congress made efforts to include different sects of 
Christianity in its prayers.29 The Town of Greece Court determined this 
reflected the inclusive nature of legislative prayer as “a benign 
acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.”30 Because the town council 
had made similar efforts to recognize religious diversity, the Court found 
it did not depart from the history and tradition of the First Congress and 
therefore was not in violation of the Establishment Clause.31  
Drawing on this approach, the American Legion Court adopted a 
new standard for determining Establishment Clause violations: where 
categories of monuments, symbols, and practices follow the history and 
traditions of the Framers, the practices are constitutional.32  
The Court then applied this standard to the Cross.33 It reasoned 
that the Cross, while a religious symbol, had become synonymous with 
World War I.34 As time progressed, the Cross also acquired historic 
significance as a reminder of the actions and sacrifice of the area’s 
 
21. Id. at 2085. 
22. Id. 
23. Id.  
24. Id. at 2086. 
25. Id.  
26. Id. 
27. 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014).  
28.  Id.  
29.  Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 591-92. 
32. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2089.  
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
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predecessors.35 Moreover, the memorial included the names of both 
Jewish and African-American soldiers, which reflected the inclusive 
tradition of the Founding Fathers.36 Finally, as a symbol for World War I, 
the Cross commemorated the deaths of diverse individuals not as a 
representation of their religion but as a symbol of the cause for which they 
died.37 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Cross did not depart 
from national tradition and was therefore constitutional.38 
 
B.   Concurring Opinions 
 
Justice Kavanaugh agreed with the Court in full, but wrote 
separately to emphasize two points.39 First, he noted the Court had avoided 
using the Lemon over the past several decades, which indicated that it was 
no longer good law.40 Instead, Justice Kavanaugh suggested that 
Establishment Clause cases should examine whether a government 
practice is coercive in addition to the history and tradition of the practice.41 
Second, Justice Kavanaugh noted that while the Court had found the Cross 
constitutional, the ruling did not mandate that Maryland continue to keep 
and maintain the statue.42 Rather, he reasoned that the AHA could turn to 
Maryland’s Court of Appeals to determine whether the Cross violated the 
state’s constitution.43 Further, the AHA could turn to the state legislature 
to either amend the Maryland Constitution or pass legislation to remove 
the Cross or transfer the land.44 Accordingly, Justice Kavanaugh 
emphasized that the United States Constitution allowed alternate avenues 
beyond the Supreme Court for the AHA to seek relief.45 
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, sought to expand on 
the Court’s opinion.46 The Justices agreed with the Court’s decision to 
follow Town of Greece in light of Lemon’s limitations; however, they 
focused on the AHA’s lack of standing.47 The Justices noted that Lemon 
gave the false perception that an offended reasonable observer had 
standing.48 To increase judicial economy and provide lower courts with 
better guidance, Justices Gorsuch and Thomas argued that courts should 
apply Town of Greece to determine whether a party has standing to assert 
 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 2089-90. 
37. Id. at 2090. 
38  Id.  
39 . Id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
40. Id. at 2092-93. 
41. Id. at 2093. 
42. Id.  
43. Id. at 2094 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. (Gorsuch, J., with Thomas, J., concurring). 
47. Id. at 2098. 
48. Id. 
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a claim under the Establishment Clause.49 Under this approach, plaintiffs 
would be required to show a practice departed from the national tradition.50  
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, criticized the Court for 
adopting a presumption of constitutionally based on a monument’s 
history.51 Justices Breyer and Kagan argued the new standard would put 
recently-constructed monuments at risk of being declared unconstitutional 
for no other reason than their youth.52 As an alternative, the Justices 
proposed that if a government practice “(i) is rooted in history and 
tradition; or (ii) treats religious people, organizations, speech, or activity 
equally to comparable secular people, organizations, speech, or activity; 
or (iii) represents a permissible legislative accommodation or exemption 
from generally applicable law,” the Establishment Clause has not been 
violated.53  
Writing separately, Justice Kagan applauded the Court’s 
sensitivity and respect for American pluralism but cautioned against the 
decision’s broad language.54 She agreed with the use of history and 
tradition to analyze Establishment Clause complaints but argued the Court 
should adopt a “case-by-case” analysis.55 
Justice Thomas found the Cross constitutional but argued that the 
Court failed to determine whether this case in fact concerned the 
Establishment Clause.56 In Justice Thomas’ view, the Establishment 
Clause applies to laws only.57 Because the AHA did not challenge a law, 
the Cross could not violate the First Amendment.58 Further, he stated that 
even if the Establishment Clause did apply, the AHA failed to demonstrate  
the Cross was an attempt by the Commission to coerce religious orthodoxy 
or force financial support for a particular religion.59 Finally, Justice 
Thomas declared that Lemon should be overruled because it lacked a 
constitutional basis and required manipulation to fit the Court’s 
conclusions, ultimately creating confusion.60 
 
C.  Dissent 
 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, stated that a 
religious symbol prominently displayed on public land is presumed to 
violate the Establishment Clause.61 Accordingly, the Cross’ status as a 
Christian symbol and its prominent display on public land created a 
 
49. Id. at 2102. 
50. Id. at 2103. 
51. Id. at 2091 (Breyer, J., with Kagan, J., concurring).  
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 2093. 
54. Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part). 
55. Id.  
56. Id. at 2095 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 2096. 
60. Id. at 2097. 
61. Id. at 2106 (Ginsberg, J., with Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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presumption that the Commission endorsed Christianity.62 However, the 
dissent noted that such a presumption could be overcome if a monument 
“‘plausibly indicates’ that the government has not sought ‘either to adopt 
[a] religious message or to urge its acceptance by others.’”63 
To determine whether the Cross could overcome this 
presumption, the dissenting Justices examined its  nature  and historical 
context.64 The dissent noted the long history and symbolism behind 
marking Christian graves with crosses, newspaper headlines announcing 
the Cross’ completion, and the keynote speaker’s message at its 
dedication, all of which indicated an underlying religious nature.65 
Additionally, the dissent stated that the War Department’s decision to 
mark overseas Jewish graves with the Star of David and Christian graves 
with crosses reflected the sectarian nature of headstones.66 Further, the 
dissent observed that, contrary to the Court’s statements, the Latin cross 
was not prominently used in World War I memorials.67 Indeed, the 
military actively avoided incorporating the Latin cross into its memorials 
due to the sensitive, sectarian nature of such memorials.68 Therefore, the 
dissent rejected the Commission’s argument that the Cross is secular.69  
Although the dissent found the Cross unconstitutional, it did not 
consider its removal appropriate or necessary.70 Rather, the Justices 
identified two alternatives: relocation or transfer to a private party.71 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 American Legion illustrates the difficulty of interpreting the 
Establishment Clause. While ultimately adopting a new standard, many 
Justices expressed misgivings in their respective opinions. Whether the 
standard proves to be an improvement over Lemon remains to be seen, but 
for now, when determining Establishment Clause cases, courts will 





63 . Id. (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 737 (2005) (Souter, 
J., dissenting)). 
64. Id. at 2107-11. 
65. Id. at 2108-09. 
66. Id. at 2111-12. 
67. Id. at 2011. 
68. Id. at 2011-12. 
69. Id. at 2112. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
